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VINDICATING THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AT A CRIMINAL TRIAL: THE NEED
FOR AN ON-THE-RECORD WAIVERt
Timothy P. O'Neill*
In June, 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided Rock v.
Arkansas.' Rock held that a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony could not be held inadmissible'per se. Significant academic attention has focused on this aspect of the case.2
Yet another aspect of Rock appears to have been overlooked. Surprisingly, Rock is the first case in which the Supreme Court has directly held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify at her trial.3 Although for many years Supreme Court opinions had
intimated that the defendant's opportunity to testify was constitution-

ally predicated,4
Rock was the first case to identify precisely where in the Constitution this right can be found.5
Rock involves the Supreme Court in a controversy which has ent
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1. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
2. See Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REv. 595 (1988);
Martin, Supreme Court 1986 Term: Hypnosis-Enhanced Testimony, 198 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1987);
Note, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments-A ConstitutionalParadigmfor Determining
the Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 853
(1988); Note, Hypnosis and the PrejudiceRule-Your Memories May Not Be Your Own, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 409 (1988); Note, Evidence-Rock v. Arkansas: Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony of a Criminal Defendant Cannot Be Per Se Excluded From Evidence, 18 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV.

297 (1988).

3. Rock, 483 U.S. at 49.
4. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) ("defendant is privileged to
testify in his own defense"); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (State could not deny
accused right to have his counsel question him to "elicit his statement."). See also infra notes 4373 and accompanying text.
5. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 49-53. See also infra text accompanying notes 84-94.

HeinOnline -- 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 809 1989-1990

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 51:809

gaged numerous lower federal and state courts during the last decade.

Increasingly, defendants who are convicted without having testified at
trial are alleging that they never properly waived their right to testify.6

Numerous issues arise from such a contention, including the nature of
the right to testify, the respective responsibilities of the trial judge and
defense attorney in protecting this right, and the manner in which a
waiver can be made. At least two states, Colorado and West Virginia,
have instituted procedures which impose a duty on the trial judge to

warn a defendant of the right to testify and to obtain a knowing and
intelligent waiver if the defendant decides not to do so. 7 Other jurisdictions have flatly refused to follow this path, and instead will presume a
proper waiver based upon defendant's failure to testify unless the defendant personally expresses some type of objection at trial.,
This Article contends that the fundamental nature of the right to

testify necessitates a personal, on-the-record waiver of that right at
trial.9 It suggests that tho~e courts which have refused to mandate an

on-the-record waiver may have acted out of fear of injecting the trial
judge into such a sensitive defense decision. Consequently, it suggests a
6. See, e.g., United States ex reL Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (only
defendant, not counsel, could validly waive right to testify); People v. Knox, 58 Ill. App. 3d 761,
374 N.E.2d 957 (1978) (defendant must make desire to testify known to the court or waive the
right).
7. in the first of these cases, People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), the court found
the defendant's right to testify so fundamental as to require for its waiver the same constitutional
standards applicable to waiver of the right to counsel. 681 P.2d at 512 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458 (1938)) (waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent). Citing Curtis, the
court in State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1988) held that the record must reflect that the
waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and that a valid waiver could not be
presumed where the record was silent. 371 S.E.2d at 81.
8. See State v. Allie, 147 Ariz. 320, 710 P.2d 430 (1985); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.
2d 403 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174
(1988); Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 502 N.E.2d 943 (1987), review
denied, 399 Mass. 1102, 504 N.E.2d 1066 (1987); People v. Simmons, 140 Mich. App. 681, 364
N.W.2d 783 (1985).
9. This Article confines itself solely to the situation of the defendant who does not testify at
trial. A related problem occurs when a defendant testifies at trial and later alleges that he was not
properly warned of the risks involved in that decision. See, e.g., People v. Longwith, 125 Cal. App.
3d 400, 178 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981); People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1986) (challenging trial
court's failure to advise defendant of right to remain silent); State v. Lo Sacco, 12 Conn. App.
481, 531 A.2d 184, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 814, 533 A.2d 568 (1987); State v. McKenzie, 17 Md.
App. 563, 303 A.2d 406 (1973) (contending reversible error where no on-the-record admonition of
right to refuse to testify); State v. Bogus, 223 N.J. Super. 409, 538 A.2d 1278 (1988), cert.
denied, 111 N.J. 567, 546 A.2d 497 (1988); Knowles v. State, 364 So. 2d 712 (Ala. Crim. App.
1978).
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compromise procedure whereby a knowing and intelligent waiver can
be obtained without any action on the part of the trial judge.
Part I discusses the early English position that barred a criminal
defendant from being a sworn witness at trial. Part II shows that the
American reaction to this tradition was essentially to establish a defendant's right to testify through statute. Part III traces the United
States Supreme Court's work in this area, culminating with Rock v.
Arkansas. Since Rock has established the constitutional basis of a defendant's right to testify, Parts IV and V examine the contours of that
right, specifically whether the right is "personal" and/or "fundamental". Parts VI and VII analyze Colorado's system of having the trial
judge obtain an on-the-record waiver from the non-testifying defendant
and other jurisdictions' responses to this system. The Article concludes
by proposing, in Parts VIII and IX, a system for obtaining an on-therecord waiver without the mandatory participation of the trial judge.
I. THE EARLY ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL

The criminal trial in early English common law bore little similarity to the contemporary American model. First, the sixteenth century
trial did not allow the defendant to have counsel.10 Second, the law did
not allow the defendant to call witnesses on his own behalf.1 There
was no esoteric rationale offered for these rules; rather, defense lawyers
and defense witnesses were barred because it was held they were not
needed.'2 Wigmore finds this statement from 1678 to epitomize the
prevailing spirit of the age:
"The fouler the crime is, the clearer and the plainer ought the proof of it to be.
There is no other good reason can be given why the law refuseth to allow the
prisoner at the bar counsel in matter of fact when his life is concerned, but only
this, because the evidence by which he is condemned ought to be so very evident
and so plain that all the counsel in the world should not be able to answer upon
it.,,13

With no counsel and no witnesses, a defendant had to rely on his
own skills of persuasion. A defendant was allowed free rein to plead his
10. Popper, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WASH.
U.L.Q. 454, 454-55. This rule was changed by statute for treason in 1695 and for felonies in
general in 1836. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 575, at 809 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979).
11. Popper, supra note 10, at 455.
12. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 575.
13. 2 Id. § 575, at 809 n.44 (quoting L.H. Steward Finch, in Lord Cornwallis' Trial, 7
How. St. Tr. 143, 149 (1678)).
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case orally before the jury, including both matters of fact and law. Yet
the defendant did not actually "testify" or offer "evidence" per se."4
Since a defendant could not be sworn, he was not a witness; consequently, nothing he said could constitute "evidence." Yet the jury certainly paid close attention to the defendant's presentation. James
Fitzjames Stephen characterized the criminal trial of the period as "a
long argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the Crown, in
which they questioned each other and grappled with each other's arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of reasoning."' 5 Thus,
the sixteenth century criminal trial lacked three items taken for
granted in contemporary trials: defense counsel, defense witnesses, and
sworn testimony from the defendant.
The first of these areas to change was that of defense witnesses.
Duringi the seventeenth century courts began to allow the defendant to
call witnesses; by 1701 defendants had a statutory right to have such
witnesses sworn in all felony cases.' 6 It might be assumed that this
trend would have naturally led to allowing the defendant to offer sworn
testimony on his own behalf. This did not occur because of a civil doctrine which began to be applied in criminal cases: the disqualification
of witnesses based on interest in the litigation." This doctrine took root
in the sixteenth century and held that parties to a civil action were
incompetent as witnesses; by the first part of the seventeenth century,
this rule was recognized in Star Chamber, the Chancery, and courts of
common law.' Wigmore described the reason for the rule in this
syllogism:
Total exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard against a false decision,
whenever the persons offered are of a class specially likely to speak falsely; persons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause are specially likely to
speak falsely; therefore such persons should be totally excluded."9

The doctrine gradually spread from parties in civil cases to witnesses in
such cases.20 By the end of the seventeenth century, the "disqualifica14.
15.

2 Id. § 575.
1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 350, 440 (1883), quoted

in Popper, supra note 10, at 455.
16. 7 Will. 3, ch. 3; 1 Anne, st. 2, ch. 9, cited in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574
(1961).
17. Popper, supra note 10, at 456.
18. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 194 (1926).
19. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 576, at 810.
20. Popper, supra note 10, at 456.
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tion for interest" rule was firmly ensconced in criminal law, affecting
both the defendant and his choice of witnesses.
Thus, only the fear of perjury supplied the rationale for keeping
the defendant off the witness stand, for2 a1 criminal defendant is clearly
"par excellence an interested witness."
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
The disqualification of a criminal defendant from testifying carried over to the American Colonies. In 1762, a Pennsylvania court refused to swear a defendant to testify, stating that issues at trial "must
be proved by indifferent witnesses. '22 At the time of the ratification of
the Constitution it was clear that a criminal defendant had no right to
testify.23
The'real impetus for change in the area began in 1827 with the
publication of Jeremy Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence.24
The gist of Bentham's argument against disqualification for interest
was that a witness's motive for lying should go to the weight, not the
admissibility, of testimony. 25 As Lord Macaulay expressed it, "[A]ll
evidence should be taken at what it may be worth, that no consideration which has a tendency to produce conviction in a rational mind
should be excluded from the consideration of the tribunals." 2 Bentham's work first came to fruition in England. Between 1843 and 1853,
legislation in that country abolished the incompetency of interested witnesses in civil cases, 27 parties in civil cases, 28 and spouses of parties in
civil cases.29 This progress was mirrored in the United States. Wigmore
notes that by the late 1850s most states had abolished disqualification
baged on interest in civil cases. 30 Yet this progress was not paralleled in
the area of criminal law, for by the late 1850s not one American jurisdiction had abolished disqualification based on interest for criminal
defendants.
21.
22.
23.

Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 (1961).
Rex v. Lukens, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 5, 6 (1762) quoted in Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 575.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971).

24. J. BENTHAM,
(London 1827).
25.

RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

(D. Berkowitz & S. Thorne ed. 1978)

See J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 576, at 811-15 (discussing J. BENTHAM, supra note

24).
26. LORD MACAULAY'S LEGISLATIVE MINUTEs 214 (C. Dharker ed. 1946) (1835).
27.
28.
29.
30.

Popper, supra note 10, at 458.
Id.
Id.
J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 576, at 817.
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There were several reasons why jurists and writers did not believe
that what was proper for the civil trial was necessarily proper for the

criminal trial. Some believed that human nature would prevent a criminal defendant from testifying truthfully. As Stephen wrote:
[T]he prisoner could never be a real witness; it is not in human nature to speak
the truth under such a pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner, and
it is not a light thing to institute a system which would almost enforce perjury on
every occasion. It is a mockery to swear a man to speak the truth who is certain
to disregard it .... 31

Another objection came from those who believed that allowing a defendant to take the stand would have the ironic effect of weakening
both the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. As one court expressed it:
[I]f we were to hold that a prisoner offering to make a statement must be
sworn in the cause as a witness, it would be difficult to protect his constitutional
rights in spite of every caution, and would often lay innocent parties under unjust
suspicion where they were honestly silent, and embarrassed and overwhelmed by
the shame of a false accusation . . . [It would result in] .. .the degradation of
our criminal jurisprudence by converting it into
an inquisitory systems from
3 2
which we have thus far been happily delivered.

These arguments were countered by Chief Justice John Appleton

of the Supreme Court of Maine. Appleton was a Benthamite who tirelessly championed the cause of allowing parties in all cases, both civil
and criminal, to testify."3 Appleton argued that it could just as easily
be maintained that the accuser, rather than the accused, was lying.
The answer was not to exclude one or the other from testifying, but

rather to let the jury decide: "With equal means of knowledge, with
equal power to instruct, with motives to truth dependent on their relative situations . . . both [the accuser and the defendant] should be
heard and believed, . . . until from comparison of their several state-

ments, reasons for belief or disbelief shall be found."'3 4 Appleton further contended that disqualifying a criminal defendant from testifying
was squarely opposed to the presumption of innocence of the accused,

for disqualifying the defendant implicitly showed that the law believed
31. 1 J. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 201-02 (1863),
quoted in Popper, supra note 10, at 458-59.
32. People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314, 320-21 (1864) (concurring opinion), quoted in Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1961).
33. For a discussion of Appleton's influence, see Popper, supra note 10, at 460-63.
34. Popper, supra note 10, at 461 (quoting J. APPLETON, EVIDENCE 123-24 (1860)).
HeinOnline -- 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 814 1989-1990
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the defendant was guilty and that the accuser was truthful. Appleton
showed how this turned the presumption of innocence on its head: "But
the common law [rule of disqualification of the defendant] selects.
Whom? The accuser, presumed a perjurer [by the presumption of innocence], alone is heard. The accused, for whose benefit such favorable
presumptions are nominally made; the accused-innocent, is rejected."35
Appleton's work was directly responsible for reform in his home state.
In 1864, Maine became the first state-indeed the first jurisdiction in
the English-speaking world 6 -to adopt legislation finding criminal defendants to be competent witnesses. 37 Other states gradually followed
Maine's lead, and by the end of the century all states but Georgia had
abolished "disqualification for interest" for criminal defendants.38 In
1878, a federal statute declaring criminal defendants competent to testify became law.39
The American experience in allowing criminal defendants to" testify had a profound effect on other common law nations. Stephen, who
previously supported the disqualification of criminal defendants,4
changed his views and wrote in support of the competency of criminal
defendants. 41 Gradually, common law nations followed America's example. By 1955, England, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Northern
Ireland, Ireland, and India had all extended42 to criminal defendants the
opportunity to testify on their own behalf.
III.

THE ROAD TO ROCK: FINDING A CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR
THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY

The near unanimity with which American jurisdictions established
35. Id.
36. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961).
37. 1864 Me. Laws 280.
38. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577.
39. Bradley, Havens, Jenkins and Salvucci. and the Defendant's "Right" to Testify, 18 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 419, 420 n.17 (1981).
40. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
41. Stephen stated:
I am convinced by much experience that questioning, or the power of giving evidence, is a
positive assistance, and a highly important one, to innocent men, and I do not see why in
the case of the guilty there need be any hardship about it ....
A poor and ill-advised
man . . . is always liable to misapprehend the true nature of his defence, and might in
many cases be saved from the consequences of his own ignorance or misfortune by being
questioned as a witness.
1 J. STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 444, quoted in Ferguson, 365 U.S at 582.
42. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 577-78.
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a statutory basis for the right to testify may have hindered consideration of whether the opportunity to testify was constitutionally predicated.4" As recently as 1986, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the court had "never explicitly held that a criminal defendant has
a due process right to testify in his own behalf.""' The court did finally
recognize such a constitutional right in Rock v. Arkansas in 1987.:1
Before examining the court's holding in Rock, it is necessary to examine the state of American law on the issue at the time the case was
decided.
A.

The United States Supreme Court and the Right to Testify: the
Record Before Rock

There is no dearth of language in Supreme Court opinions establishing that some kind of "right to be heard" is an essential component
of due process. Thus, in 1897 the Court declared: "At common law no
man was condemned without being afforded opportunity to be heard
...
. Can it be doubted that due process of law signifies a right to be
heard in one's defence?" 4 6 The following year, the Court said that the
concept of due process included "certain immutable principles of justice. . . as that no man shall be condemned in his person or property
without . . . an opportunity ofbeing heard in his defence."47 (This latter statement was cited approvingly by the Court in Powell v. Alabama.4 8 ) In dictum in In re Oliver,49 the Court provided details on just
what this "right to be heard" entailed. The Court said it "include[d],
as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel. ' 50 Again, in Walder v.
United States, the Court alluded to a right to testify when it stated,
"Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest oppor51
tunity to meet the accusation against him."1
The Court appeared to have an opportunity to decide whether the
43. See Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913, 920-23 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding constitutional
right to testify under fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments).
44. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986).
45. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). For a discussion of Rock, see infra notes 77-94 and accompanying

text,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 415, 417 (1897).
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898).
287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
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Constitution guaranteed a criminal defendant a right to testify when it
decided Ferguson v. Georgia 2 in 1961. At that time, Georgia law held
that any person charged with an indictable offense was incompetent to
testify at trial.53 However, another Georgia statute provided that a
criminal defendant had the right to make an unsworn statement to the
jury and to remain immune from cross-examination.54 At trial, defendant Ferguson wanted his attorney to ask him questions, but the court
refused to allow it.
When the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in this
case, 55 one might have expected that the Court would use it to decide
whether a state could constitutionally declare a criminal defendant to
be incompetent to testify at his own trial. Indeed, in the first line of
Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court, he states that Georgia may
have been the last common law jurisdiction in the world to have retained that particular rule. 6 But the opinion quickly notes both that
Ferguson had neither asked to be sworn as a witness at trial, 57 nor
asked the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of the incompetency statute.58 Consequently, the only issue was whether the trial
court's decision not to allow Ferguson to have his attorney aid him in
making his unsworn statement violated due process by depriving him of
the "guiding hand of counsel." 59 The Supreme Court held that Georgia's action did indeed violate due process. 60
I Although Ferguson did not explicitly consider the constitutionality
of the law making criminal defendants incompetent to testify, it certainly suggested that such a law was improper. As one commentator
noted, "[1]f it is a denial of due process not to permit the defendant to
be examined directly by his attorney, then surely it is an even greater
denial of due process to refuse the defendant any opportunity to testify
in his own behalf." 61 Moreover, in concurring opinions both Justices
52. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
53. Id. at 570.
54. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-415 (1933). In 1973, Georgia abandoned the policy of permitting
a criminal defendant the opportunity to make an unsworn statement, and now through statute
guarantees the right of the defendant to testify at her own trial. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-7-28
& 24-9-20 (1982).
55. Ferguson v. Georgia, 362 U.S. 901 (1960) (probable jurisdiction noted).

56. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 570.
57.

Id. at 572 n.1.

58. Id. at 572.
59. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
60. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 596.
61. Note, Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the Defendant's Right to
HeinOnline -- 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 817 1989-1990
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Clark and Frankfurter stated that they would have held the incompetency statute to be unconstitutional.62
For the next quarter of a century, the Supreme Court continued to
scatter hints that the right to testify was constitutionally predicated. In
Harris v. New York the Court stated that "[e]very criminal defendant
is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. ''83 The

next year in Brooks v. Tennessee the Court abandoned the "privilege"
terminology by stating "[w]hether the defendant is to testify is an im'64
portant tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right.
Although it had never been squarely held, the Court in 1975 wrote that
"[i]t is now accepted.

. .

that an accused has a right.

. .

to testify on

behalf."65

his own
These references continued unabated during the decade leading up
to Rock.66 Yet, as previously discussed, 7 in 1986 the Court conceded
in Nix v. Whiteside68 that it had "never explicitly held that a criminal
defendant has a due process right to testify in his own behalf. '6 9 In his
concurring opinion in Nix, 70 Justice Blackmun wrote that he was
"somewhat puzzled" by the majority's assertion that the constitutionality of the defendant's right to testify remained an "open question", and
cited Jones v. Barnes,7 ' Brooks v. Tennessee,72 and Harris v. New
York"3 to illustrate its constitutional basis.
B. Lower Courts and the Right to Testify: The Record Before Rock
The -,Court's uncertainty about the constitutional nature of the
Testify, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 523-24 (1976).
62. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 601 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 602 (Clark, J.,
concurring).
63. 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
64. 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972).
65. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.15 (1975) (citing Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 225 (1971)).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 56 n.2 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(contending that right to testify is found in the sixth and fourteenth amendments); United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 96 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to "constitutional" right
to testify); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (stating that defendant's decision to testify
is fundamental).
67. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
68. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
69. Id. at 164.
70. Id. at 186 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
71. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
72. 406 U.S. 605 (1971).
73. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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right to testify, exhibited in the 1986 Nix opinion, was reflected in the
decisions of both state and lower federal courts which had grappled
with the issue. Although the trend in these courts was in the direction

74
of finding a constitutional basis for the defendant's right to testify,
the record was hardly unanimous. A number of jurisdictions which examined the issue recognized no constitutional basis for the defendant's

right to testify, 75 finding the right to be solely a statutory matter. This

was the state of the law at the time the Supreme Court granted certio76
rari in Rock v. Arkansas.
C. Rock v. Arkansas: Establishing a Constitutional Foundationfor
the Defendant's Right to Testify

In 1983, Vicki Lorene Rock was charged with manslaughter in the
shooting death of her husband. 7 Because of her inability to remember
the details surrounding the shooting, her attorney arranged two hypno-

sis sessions with a licensed neuropsychologist. Following the sessions,
74. See, e.g., United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 375-76 (1st Cir.)
(dictum) (due process clause of fifth amendment may grant accused right to testify), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 847 (1985); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir.) (right to testify derived
from fifth and sixth amendments), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d
913, 923 (7th Cir. 1982) (fifth, sixth and fourteenth amendments give rise to right to testify);
Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (due process requires defendant be
given opportunity to speak if he so requests), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 966 (1979); United States ex
rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3rd Cir. 1977) (right to fair trial includes right to testify);
United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp.
1145, 1148 (D. Me. 1986) (right to testify basic to a fair trial); Carter v. State, 424 So. 2d 1336,
1340 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982) (state constitution); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1973);
State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514 P.2d 460 (1973); Figeroa v. State, 244 Ark. 457, 425 S.W.2d
516 (1968); People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1970); People v. Curtis,
681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984), see supra note 7; Hall v. Oakley, 409 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1982) (state
constitution); People v. Knox, 58 Il. App. 3d 761, 374 N.E.2d 957, 959-60 (1978) (defendant's
right to testify is of "constitutional dimension"); Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 413 (Iowa
1985); Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 502 N.E.2d 943 (1987); People v.
Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 193 N.W.2d 363, 369 (1971); State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877
(Minn. 1979); Ingle v. State, 92 Nev. 104, 546 P.2d 598 (1976); State v. Douglas, 292 Or. 516,
641 P.2d 561, 567 (1982) (Lent, J., concurring); Campbell v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 100, 469
S.W.2d 506, 509 (1971); State v. Hardy, 37 Wash. App. 463, 681 P.2d 852, 854 (1984); State v.
Albright, 96 Wisc. 2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487, 490, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Young v. Ricketts, 242 Ga. 559, 250 S.E.2d 404, 405-06 (1978) (right to
testify not a guaranteed personal right), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934 (1979); State v. McKenzie, 17
Md. App. 563, 303 A.2d 406, 413 (1973) (right to testify is statutory, not constitutional); State v.
Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. 1970).
76. 479 U.S. 947 (1986) (granting certiorari).
77. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987).
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Ms. Rock remembered certain exculpatory details.7 8 In response to the
state's motion to bar defendant's "hypnotically refreshed" testimony,
the trial judge ordered that Ms. Rock's testimony should be limited to
"matters remembered and stated to the [hypnosis] examiner prior to
being placed under hypnosis." 7 With this limitation on her testimony,
Ms. Rock was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court held as a matter of law that a witness's hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissibie per se.8 0
The United States Supreme Court found such a per se rule as
applied to a defendant to be unconstitutional. 8 Before reaching this
decision, however, the Court first had to squarely confront the issue of
whether a defendant has a constitutional right to testify in her own
behalf.
After briefly reviewing the historical transition from defendant's
incompetency to competency in common law jurisdictions, Justice
Blackmun's opinion for the Court stated that the right of the defendant
to testify "has sources in several provisions of the Constitution." 82 First,
citing Faretta v. California,8 In re Oliver,8 4 and Ferguson v. Georgia,"6 the Court held that the right to testify was a fundamental part of
the adversary system and was thus guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 86 Second, the Court found this
right implicit in the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment.81 Relying on Washington v. Texas8 8 and United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal8 9 the Court reasoned that, if the clause supported
the right of a defendant to present witnesses who will provide material
and favorable evidence on his behalf, then it would a fortiori support
the defendant's choice to offer such testimony himself.9 0 Indeed, the
78. Id. at 46-47. For example, she recalled that her fingers had never been on the trigger,
thus supporting a claim that the gun discharged accidentally.
79. Id. at 47.
80. Rock v. State, 288 Ark. 566, 708 S.W.2d 78, 81 (1986).
81. Rock, 483 U.S. at 62.
82. Id. at 51.
83. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
84. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
85. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
86. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51 (1987).
87. Id. at 52.
88. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
89. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
90. Rock, 483 U.S. at 52.
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Court noted that often "the most important witness for the defense in
• . . criminal cases is the defendant himself." 9' 1
Third, the Court found yet another way in which the right to testify is guaranteed under the sixth amendment. The Court pointed out
that Farettav. California held that the sixth amendment supported the
right of a defendant to waive the assistance of counsel and represent
himself at trial, if he so desires, because so many of the rights in the
amendment accrue personally to the defendant.9 2 Rock then concluded
that even more basic than the right to represent oneself would be a
defendant's right to actually testify in his own words concerning the
events in question. 3
Finally, Rock found yet a fourth constitutional basis for the defendant's right to testify embodied in the fifth amendment. The Court
held that the right of a defendant not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself necessarily included the right to testify on one's behalf
if one so desires. 4
Thus, Rock v. Arkansas established once and for all that a criminal defendant does indeed have a federal constitutional right to testify
on his own behalf. Yet the resolution of this issue has spawned several
new ones. The first issue is whether the defendant or his attorney
should have the final decision on whether a defendant takes the stand.
IV. THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY: WHOSE RIGHT IS IT, ANYWAY?

Constitutional rights possessed by criminal defendants can generally be divided into two categories: those which can be waived through
the actions of defendant's counsel, and those which can be waived only
by the defendant himself.9 5 Some commentators discuss this in terms of
"allocation of decision-making responsibility;"9 6 others speak in terms
91.

Id.

92. As the Rock court expressed it:
[I]n Faretta... the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment "grants to the accused

personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the wit-

nesses against him,' and who must be accorded 'compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor.'"
483 U.S. at 52 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975)).

93. Id. at 52.
94. Id. at 52-53 (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) and Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
95. See generally Note, supra note 61, at 529-32.
96. See White, FederalHabeas Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REv. 67, 69 (1972).
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of "personal waiver;" 97 and still others employ a "fundamental rights
versus trial decisions" dichotomy.18 Yet whatever nomenclature is used,
the common idea that runs through the schemes is that the decision to
waive certain constitutional rights is solely the defendant's prerogative.
Several decisions of the United States Supreme Court illustrate
this concept. For example, a jury trial can be waived only with a criminal defendant's "express, intelligent consent. 99 A guilty plea cannot be
taken without the defendant's personal agreement. 10 0 The decision
whether or not to appeal a conviction is one for the defendant, not his
attorney, to make.' 0 '
On the other hand, numerous decisions concerning trial strategy
and tactics are the responsibility of the trial counsel. Such a list would
include decisions as to which witnesses should be called; what questions
should be asked on direct and cross examination; what stipulations
should be made; what objections should be lodged; and what pre-trial
motions should be made.' 02 This is not to say that an attorney is not
responsible for the decisions he makes in these areas. Ineptitude resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel may be raised pursuant to the
standard of Strickland v. Washington.'"' Yet the mere fact that a defendant disagrees with his attorney's decisions in these areas does not
provide grounds for reversal. As Justice Harlan succinctly noted, on
most trial-related issues "a lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial even in the face of his client's incomprehension or even explicit disapproval."' 0 4
97.

See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN.

L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1970).
98. See State v. McKenzie, 17 Md. App. 563, 303 A.2d 406, 418 (1973).
Professor Marcy Strauss has suggested yet another way of differentiating these functions: the
"means-ends" paradigm. Viewed in this way, the client decides the "ends" of the lawsuit while the

attorney controls the "means." Thus, in the criminal setting, Strauss characterizes decisions such
as whether to plead, whether to waive a jury, and whether to appeal as "ends" which must be left
to the defendant, while "trial tactics" such as whether and how to cross-examine and whether to
lodge an objection are "means" decisions which can be left to the discretion of the attorney.
Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy,
65 N.C.L. REV. 315, 318-19 (1987).
99. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942); accord, Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
100. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
101. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (dictum).
102. See, e.g., 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-5.2 (2d ed. Supp. 1986)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
103. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
104. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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In Rock v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court did not need to decide
whether the right to testify is the kind of right which requires a personal waiver from the defendant or whether it is in the area of "trial
tactics" to be left to the defense attorney. Yet evidence suggests that, if
faced with this precise issue, the Court would find it to be a personal
right of the defendant. For example, the majority opinion in Rock
characterizes the defendant's right to testify on her own behalf as a
"fundamental" constitutional right. 05 Similarly, when the Supreme
06 formulated its test for finding waivers by
Court in Johnson v. Zerbst1
a defendant, it spoke in terms of "fundamental constitutional
rights."' 1 7 As one commentator has noted, "[i]t appears that the decisive factor in the decision to require personal waiver is the fundarhental
nature of the right at stake." 08 This is emphasized by the Rock
Court's quotation of a statement from Jones v. Barnes'01 that the defendant has the "ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, [such as] whether to

. .

.testify in his or her

0

own behalf."" In support of this dictum, Jones cited two sources: Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes"' and the
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice." 2 In his
concurrence in Wainwright, Chief Justice Burger relied on the A.B.A.
Standards for the dictum that a basic decision such as whether to testify in his own behalf is ultimately one for the accused alone to
make."'
The A.B.A. standard discussed by both Chief Justice Burger and
the Jones Court, which is now Standard 4-5.2, states:
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the [criminal] case are ultimately

for the accused and others are ultimately for defense 'counsel. The decisions
which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i)

105. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n.10 (1987).
106. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
107. Id. at 464.
108. Developments in the Law-FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1111
(1970).
109. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
110. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n.10 (1987) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
751 (1983)).
111. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
93 n.1 (1977)).
112. Id. at 753 (citing CRIMINAL Jus-cE, supra note 102).
113. 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977).
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what plea to enter; (ii) 1whether to waive jury trial; and (iii) whether to testify in
his or her own behalf.

4

Interestingly, the Commentary to the Standard cites absolutely no case

support for the proposition that the decision to testify is personal to the
defendant. 115 Yet there is lower court support suggesting that the de-

fendant 6must make the ultimate decision on whether or not to
11
testify.
Thus, prevailing case law suggests that the Supreme Court would
find that the right to testify can only be waived personally by the de-

fendant. Several policy reasons also argue in favor of recognizing that
such a.decision should be the defendant's alone. First, if the defendant
should have final say over whether to exercise those rights deemed "inherently personal and basic,"" 7 it would seem proper to include among
these the right to testify, deemed by one court to be "of inestimable

value.""" The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he most persuasive
counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant

might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself." 119 As noted above, 120
the Rock court itself analogized the situation to a defendant's decision
to represent himself at trial if he so chooses,' 2 ' and concluded that the
114. CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 102. The remainder of the standard reads:
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination,
what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic
and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the
client.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between the lawyer
and the client, the lawyer should make a record of the circumstances, the lawyer's advice
and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The record should be made in a manner which
protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
115. See id. The only authority cited are two articles: Levy, Some Comments on the Trial
of a Criminal Case, 10 REc. A. B. CITY N.Y. 203 (1955); Steinberg & Paulsen, A Conversation
with Defense Counsel on Problems of a Criminal Defense, PRAC. LAW., May, 1961, at 25.
116. See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1080 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978); Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum);
Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Alaska 1973) (defendant should be permitted to testify if
he requests); State v. McKinney, 221 Kan. 691, 561 P.2d 432, 433 (1977); State v. Rosillo, 281
N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979); Ingle v. State, 29 Nev. 104, 546 P.2d 598 (1976).
117. People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 511 (Colo. 1984). See also infra notes 153-61 and
accompanying text.
118. Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
119. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (plurality opinion) (discussing right of allocution), reh'g denied, 365 U.S. 890 (1961).
120. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
121. This was the issue in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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decision whether or not to testify is an equally personal decision. If the
defendant should be given every opportunity to make those decisions
which may result in his remaining free from incarceration, clearly the
right to testify is one of them.
Even if the majority of defendants we'e to make foolish tactical
decisions on this issue, there is a second, more philosophical, reason
why a defendant should still be given this power. At least one commentator has expressed it in terms of "human dignity":
If the right to testify in one's own behalf is to have any meaning, it cannot be
taken away from a defendant who feels the human instinct to meet the accusa-

tions against him despite counsel's advice that unfortunate consequences may
result. A defendant should be recognized as having a basic right to plead his case
before his peers, and neither the court nor defense counsel should be permitted to
1 22
deprive a defendant of that right to exercise his free will.

As Judge Godbold wrote in Wright v. Estelle, regardless of whether
choosing to testify is tactically correct, the defendant's "desire to tell
'his side' in a public forum may be of overriding importance to him
..

.

. The wisdom or unwisdom of the defendant's choice does not di-

23
minish his right to make it.'
The legal literature points out a third consideration, namely that
in practice defense attorneys accede to a defendant's desire to testify
over an attorney's objection. A review of the literature in the area led
one commentator to conclude that it was the "general belief of expert
criminal attorneys" that the defendant must agree before his right to
testify is waived. 124 Professor Amsterdam perhaps best summarized
this view from the defense attorney's perspective: "Counsel may properly urge the defendant that it is unwise or dangerous for the defendant
to take the stand. If, however, a defendant wishes to testify despite
advice to the contrary, it is probably best to yield to his or her stubbornness.' 25 This is not to suggest that courts are unanimous in finding the decision of whether or not to testify to be personal to the defendant. 6 Yet the potent combination of lower court case law, legal
122. Note, supra note 61, at 535-36.
123. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1078-79 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978).
124. See Note, supra note 61, at 536-37.
125.

1 A.

AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §

391 (4th

ed. 1984).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Norwood, 798 F.2d 1094, 1100 (7th Cir.) ("counsel's decision not to have [defendant] testify clearly should be considered sound trial strategy"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Dyer, 784 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1986) (characterizing
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literature, and signals from the Supreme Court would seem to suggest

that this will be firmly established in the future.
V.

JUST

How

"FUNDAMENTAL"

IS THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF A

DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY?

Rock v. Arkansas has firmly established that the defendant's right
to testify is constitutionally predicated. 121 And, although not directly
decided by the Supreme Court, there is good reason to believe that the

defendant's right to testify is one of those few "fundamental rights"
that can be waived only by the defendant herself, and not by the defense attorney. 128 Many courts already accept this proposition.' 29
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 3 0 the Supreme Court characterized the

waiver of a fundamental right as "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege."' 3 ' In other words, there
can be no waiver of a fundamental right unless the person is aware that
he has such a right. 1 2 Thus, to insure that waivers of fundamental
rights are "knowing," mechanisms are often used to guarantee both

that defendants understand the rights and that any waivers of those
rights are matters of record. Thus, in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the taking of guilty pleas is governed by Rule 11;133 the

making of a jury waiver is governed by Rule 23;1' and the right to
counsel is covered by Rule 44.15
Despite all the case law that refers to the defendant's right to tes-

tify as being a "personal," "fundamental" right, 13 similar mechanisms
the decision to testify as "attorney's tactics"); United States v. Cariello, 536 F. Supp. 698 (D.N.J.
1982) (characterizing decision as a strategic one for defense counsel); State v. McKenzie, 17 Md.
App. 563, 303 A.2d 406 (1973) (characterizing the issue as one of "trial tactics" to be made by
the defense attorney).
127. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
128. But see supra note 126.
129. See supra note 116.
130. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
131. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
132. Compare Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (fourth amendment search requires only voluntary, not knowing or intelligent, waiver).
133. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
134. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23.
135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
136. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(whether to testify ultimately decision for accused to make); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d
750, 756 (9th Cir. 1989) (characterizing the right to testify as "fundamental" and "personal" and
holding that it can be relinquished only by thedefendant); United States ex reL Wilcox v. JohnHeinOnline -- 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 826 1989-1990
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are curiously absent in most American jurisdictions. An excellent illustration of this problem is provided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
3 7 Following a
case of State v. Albright.1
felony conviction, Sharon Albright filed a state post-conviction petition alleging that she had been
denied the right to testify on her own behalf. 138 At a post-conviction
hearing, she asserted that she asked her attorney four times if she could
testify at trial. Her attorney said that prior to trial he told Albright
that he did not believe it would be good strategy for her to testify. He
reiterated this two days before the trial.
On the day of the trial, a conference Was held in the judge's chambers. Ms. Albright, her lawyer, the prosecutor, and the judge were present. The prosecutor inquired whether the defendant planned to testify.
Her lawyer said he did not expect her to do so. The defendant said
nothing at the time. However, following the conference, she again
asked her attorney if she could testify. She admitted that at no time
did she speak to the trial judge because "she did not know or understand her attorney's 'reasoning.' "139
This is the factual record which faced the Wisconsin Supreme
Court. The court began its opinion by first concluding that a defendant's right to testify is guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 40 It characterized this as an "important constitutional right."'' Next, the court considered who should make such a
decision and concluded that "the decision whether to testify should be
made by the defendant after consulting with counsel."' 42
Up to this point, the court held that the defendant's right to testify
is an important, personal, constitutional right. But then the court distinguished the right to testify from a traditional fundamental right.
First, it held that a personal waiver of the right to testify was unnecessary; it concluded that "counsel, in the absence of the express disapproval of the defendant on the record during the pretrial or trial proson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (dictum); United States v. Pinkney, 551 F.2d 1241 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (defendant must personally participate in waiver of right to testify); People v. Curtis, 681
P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984) (procedural safeguards are necessary to protect fundamental right to
testify).
137. 96 Wis. 2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980).
138. 291 N.W.2d at 488-89.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 489-90.
141. Id. at 491.
142. Id. at 492.
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ceedings, may waive the defendant's right to testify."'1 43 Second, it
rejected a proposal that the trial judge should have a duty to advise the
defendant sua sponte that she indeed has a right to testify. The court
curtly noted that "[s]uch admonition is subject to abuse in interpretation and may provoke substantial judicial participation that could frustrate a thoughtfully considered decision by the defendant and counsel
1 44
who are designing trial strategy."'
Turning to the facts of the case at bar, the court noted that the
trial record included nothing to suggest that Albright did not agree
with her attorney's decision that she not testify. Consequently, her silence at trial waived any issue on this point in her motion for a new
trial. Thus, the court affirmed the order dismissing her motion for a
new trial.
Justice Abrahamson, in dissent, focused on the analytical quagmire created by the majority opinion:
The majority has in effect created a third category of constitutional rights,
namely, "an important constitutional right" which lies somewhere between a
"fundamental" right, which only the defendant may personally waive, and a less
fundamental constitutional right labeled a "trial or tactical decision," which is
left exclusively to the determination of defense counsel without any necessity for
consultation with or concurrence by
the defendant. The majority puts the "right
14 5
to testify" into this new category.

The dissent went on to criticize the majority opinion's rule that a defendant waives her right to testify unless she makes known to the trial
court her disagreement with counsel's actions. The dissent found it
"unrealistic"' 46 to believe that the average defendant would "do battle ' ' 47 with her attorney in this way. More importantly, the.dissent
faulted the majority for not discussing what the obligations of defense
counsel are in advising d defendant of her constitutional right to testify
48
or not to testify.'
The Albright majority approaches the question of a defendant's
right to testify in a curiously paradoxical way. On the one hand, it hails
the right to testify as an "important constitutional right" and empha143. Id.
144. Id. at 493 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 495.
147. Id.
148. The majority also failed to indicate whether counsel's failure to advise the defendant of
her constitutional right to testify constituted ineffective assistance of counsel or whether counsel's
waiver of the defendant's right should be examined as a mere tactical decision. Id.
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sizes that the decision is a personal one for the defendant. On the other
hand, the majority is essentially willing to view silence on the part of
the defendant as constituting a waiver. Moreover, it fails to establish a
mechanism to insure that the defendant even knows that she possesses
this important constitutional right. The majority opinion expressly refused to place a duty on the trial judge to inform defendant of this
right. 149 As the dissent noted, it refused to discuss exactly what defense
counsel's obligations are in this matter.
The Albright approach is "see no evil, hear no evil;" if the defendant does not testify and does not complain, the court is willing to presume that there is no problem. This laissez-faire method is totally at
odds with the "knowing and intelligent" waiver approach of Johnson v.
Zerbst. 50 Thus, as the dissent asserts, the majority indeed reached out
to create a "third category" of constitutional rights to cover, its anomalous approach.
Wisconsin is by no means alone in placing a burden on the defendant to object to counsel's failure to allow him to testify. As will be
shown,' 51 several other jurisdictions also insist that a defendant should
personally decide whether to testify, but likewise consider that a defendant's failure to raise an objection at trial will constitute a waiver of
the issue. One court has characterized this as the "contemporaneous
request" 'approach . 52 What is particularly troubling is the failure of
most of these jurisdictions to establish any mechanism to guarantee
that the defendant is aware that he has such a right. Most of these
"contemporaneous request" jurisdictions require neither judicial warnings nor an on-the-record waiver of the defendant's right to testify.
Before analyzing why so nany jurisdictions follow the "contemporaneous request" system, it is useful to consider Colorado, a jurisdiction
which requires full judicial warnings and an on-the-record waiver. An
analysis of the Colorado system-and the largely negative response it
has received from other jurisdictions-will further illustrate the
problems in this area.
VI.

PERSONAL WARNINGS AND PERSONAL WAIVERTHE COLORADO SYSTEM

In 1984, the Colorado Supreme Court confronted the issue of a
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 493.
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
See infra notes 164-75 and accompanying text.
In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 460 A.2d 472, 475 (1983).
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defendant's right to testify in People v. Curtis.15 3 Curtis involved two
different criminal defendants, each of whom did not testify at trial and
later alleged that his right to testify was violated.
The court began its analysis by first finding that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify at his trial. 154 It then established that it was the kind of "fundamental" right which required personal waiver by the defendant under the "knowing and intelligent"
standard established by Johnson v. Zerbst. 55 Rather than stopping
there, the court then concluded that "procedural safeguards" were necessary to guarantee that the defendant understood the significance of
waiving such a right. Curtis proceeded to assign the trial judge the
burden of ascertaining whether the defendant has properly exercised
such a waiver, and established the following procedure:
A trial court . . . [should] advis[e] the defendant outside the presence of
the jury that he has a right to testify, that if he wants to testify then no one can
prevent him from doing so, that if he testifies the prosecutor will be allowed to
cross-examine him, that if he has been convicted of a felony the prosecutor will
be entitled to ask him about it and thereby disclose it to the jury, and that if the
felony conviction is disclosed to the jury then the jury can be instructed to consider it only as it bears upon his credibility. . . . [T]he defendant should also be
advised that he has a right not to testify and that if he does not testify then the
jury can be instructed about that right.188

Curtis stressed that the essential purpose of placing the warnings and
waiver on the record was to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver, to
prevent post-conviction disputes on the issue, and to facilitate appellate
review. 15 7 Thus, the court stressed that it would even be proper for defense counsel to give the warnings to the defendant, so long as the colloquy was conducted on the record in the presence of the trial judge.1 58
Curtis thus established that the issue of whether a defendant was
knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to testify had to be established by the trial court on the trial record. Other jurisdictions have
153. 681 P.2d 504 (Colo. 1984).
154. Id. at 510.
155. Id. at 512 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)). The Curtis court provided
several reasons why this right was important enough to be "fundamental": 1) the crucial role the
right to testify plays in determining the outcome of a criminal case; 2) how incalculably important
it could be for a defendant to be able to tell his own story to the jury in his own words; and 3) how
allowing the defendant to make such a key trial decision lends dignity and legitimacy to the entire
criminal trial process. Id. at 512-14.
156. Id. at 514.
157. Id. at 515.
158. Id.
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given the Curtis approach a largely negative reaction. While West Virginia whole-heartedly adopted the Curtis rule in 1988,111 every other
jurisdiction which has been asked to adopt Curtis has flatly refused.18 0
Yet it is one thing for a court to refuse to adopt a specific mechanism
for guaranteeing a proper waiver, i.e., the Curtis approach; what is
troubling is the failure of these courts to suggest any alternative mech-

anism. Instead, these courts cling to Albright's "see no evil, hear no
evil" position, providing stirring rhetoric about a defendant's sacred
right to testify, while remaining curiously silent on how a defendant
can learn about, much less exercise, this right.
As noted previously, the jurisdictions which reject the Curtis approach generally follow the "contemporaneous request" standard.16 '
One court described the standard as follows:
[If a] defendant has acquiesced in the competent advice of his attorney not to
take the stand, and has failed to assert his right at or before the trial, he is
deemed to have waived it. That is, while the decision to testify is one ultimately
for the defendant to make, the right is "subject to the limitation that
the defend62
ant make his objection known at trial, not as an afterthought."'
1 63
A substantial number of courts follow this standard.

The concept of "contemporaneous request" appears to be based on
159. See State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77 (W.Va. 1988). See also supra note 7.
160. See United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989); State v. Allie, 147 Ariz.
320, 710 P.2d 430 (1985); State v. Paradise, 213 Conn. 388, 567 A.2d 1221 (1990); TorresArboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988); Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988); Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 23 lMass. App. Ct. 384, 502
N.E.2d 943, review denied, 399 Mass. 1102, 504 N.E.2d 1066 (1987); People v. Simmons, 140
Mich. App. 681, 364 N.W.2d 783 (1985).
161. The phrase "contemporaneous request" appears to have been first used in Polster, The
Dilemma of the Perjurious Defendant: Resolution, Not Avoidance, 28 CAsE W. REs. L. Rav. 3,
12 (1977).
162. In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 460 A.2d 472, 475 (1983) (citations omitted).
163. See United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez, 883-F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847
(1985); United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1036
(1984); State v. Allie, 147 Ariz. 320, 710 P.2d 430 (1985); State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 514
P.2d 460 (1973); State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271 (1971); State v. Paradise, 213 Conn.
388, 567 A.2d 1221 (1990); Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 901 (1988); Cutter v. State, 460 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Berry, 172
Ill. App. 3d 256, 526 N.E.2d 502 (1988); People v. Knox, 58 111.App. 3d 761, 374 N.E.2d 957
(1978); Commonwealth v. Waters, 399 Mass. 708, 506 N.E.2d 859 (1987); Commonwealth v.
Hennessey, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 502 N.E.2d 943 (1987), review denied, 339 Mass. 1102, 504
N.E.2d 1066 (1987); In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 460 A.2d 472 (1983); State v. Albright, 96 Wis.
2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957 (1980).
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premises totally lacking in empirical support. People v. Knox"" pro-

vides a good illustration of the problem. Following his conviction at a
bench trial, defendant filed a pro se motion before being sentenced in
which he alleged that his attorney had prevented him from testifying.
In the exact language of the defendant, the motion declared, inter alia:
I told [my attorney] that I wanted to testify about Nine time But he said I
shouldn't Because the Judge would take my testimony As A Lie. I was patiently
sitting there waiting for the Judge to Ask me Did I have anything to say Before I
was found Guilty or not Guilty And if I wanted to testify.""5

The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant argued that

the trial court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing.
The Knox court emphatically held both that a defendant had a
constitutional right to testify 68 and that the ultimate decision on
whether to testify belonged to the defendant.1 67 Yet the appellate court
held that there was no need for the trial court to have held an eviden-

tiary hearing, stating:
If defendant had desired so strongly to testify he certainly could have made this
evident to the court, and when defense counsel rested and closing arguments
commenced it would be clear to anyone that defendant should have asserted his
desire to testify at that point in the proceedings . . . .Based on this record...
we believe the trial court could properly conclude that defendant acquiesced in
his counsel's decision not to place him on the stand.'0 8

Consider the court's confident assertion about what is "clear" to a de-

fendant concerning technical concepts such as "closing arguments," the
"defense resting," and when and how an objection is properly raised.
Now compare this to the language used by the defendant in his pro se

motion. 69 The court's assumptions obviously have no basis in reality.
Other "contemporaneous request" decisions make equally absurd

statements concerning the level of technical legal knowledge a defendant is expected to have in asserting his right to testify.'7 0 They often
164. 58 Ill. App. 3d 761, 374 N.E.2d 957 (1978).
165. 374 N.E.2d at 959.
166. Id. at 960.
167. Id. at 961.
168. Id. at 962 (emphasis added).
169. See supra text accompanying note 165.
170. See, e.g., People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1965). The court
held that since the defendant did not place the conflict he had with his attorney regarding his
right to testify on the record, he had waived the issue on appeal. 43 Cal. Rptr. at 236. The court
blithely held that, "[i]n such circumstances, a defendant should first request the court to remove
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place heavy personal burdens on the defendant: a presumption that the
defendant understands he has the right to testify;' 71 a presumption that
he knows this right is personal;' 72 a presumption that the defendant
knows he must personally raise the issue at trial if his attorney does
not; 73 and a presumption that he should realize that he must ask for
his attorney to be replaced if there is a conflict on this issue.'" 4 Yet

they almost never create any mechanism whereby a defendant is directly told on the record about these rights and duties. "Contemporaneous request" jurisdictions are usually the staunchest opponents of
any suggestion that a defendant be formally apprised on the record
concerning his right to testify.' 75
It would seem elementary that the best way to eliminate appeals

by defendants claiming that they were denied their right to testify at
trial would be to mandate that, whenever a defendant does not take the

stand, the trial record must include a knowing and intelligent waiver of
that right by the defendant. Why are courts rejecting the Curtis ap-

proach and thus opening themselves to appeals by defendants alleging
they never properly waived their right to testify?
VII. THE RELUCTANCE OF COURTS TO MAKE THE TRIAL JUDGE A
FORMAL PARTICIPANT IN THE DEFENDANT'S DECISION WHETHER TO
TESTIFY
Clearly, instituting the Curtis system would go a long way towards

eliminating post-conviction attacks on convictions by defendants claimhis attorney and substitute a new lawyer or the defendant in person." Id. See also State v. Tillery,
107 Ariz. 34, 481 P.2d 271 (1971); Cutter v. State, 460 So. 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
171. See, e.g., Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988) (court found the
defendant aware of his right to testify based on counsel's belief that defendant was aware of this
right). See also supra text accompanying note 168.
172. See generally Hammerman, A C iminal Defendant's Constitutional Right to Testify-The Implications of United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 23 VILL L. REv. 678, 683-85
(1977) (discussing implications of a "personal" constitutional right).
173. See In re Mecier, 143 Vt. 23, 460 A.2d 472, 475 (1983) ("Were defendant's desires to
testify in his own behalf as strong and unrelentless as he now claims they were, he would not have
maintained his silence throughout the entire trial.") (citing State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 481
P.2d 271, 275 (1971)).
174. See Mecier, 460 A.2d at 475. The court concludes that the defendant who wishes to
testify might "easily" have directed his request to the court or made motion to have his attorney
removed. Id. (citation omitted). But see United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115
(3d Cir. 1977) (criminal defendant cannot be forced to forgo assistance of counsel in exchange for
right to testify).
175. See supra note 160.
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ing they were denied the right to testify. An on-the-record waiver
would cle*ar up the ambiguity that now exists in so many trial records.
Considering this, it is interesting to note the mixed feelings exhibited by some courts in rejecting a Curtis system of on-the-record
waiver. For example, the Florida Supreme Court expressly rejected
Curtis in Torres-Arboledo v. State, 7 ' and yet in a footnote stated it
would be "advisable"' 77 for the trial judge to make a record inquiry as
to defendant's decision not to testify. In rejecting an on-the-record
waiver; the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts nonetheless suggested in a footnote that it "may be the better practice" for a judge to
warn a defendant before trial of his rights to testify and not to testify.178 In rejecting on-the-record warnings by the judge, the Court of
Appeals of Georgia nonetheless said it "may be the better practice"' 79
to give such warnings, and that "under some circumstances it must be
done.," 0
Why do courts engage in this "cat and mouse" game? What explains the reluctance simply to institute a Curtis system of mandatory
warnings and on-the-record waiver? The answer appears to lie in the
reluctance of courts to formally involve the trial judge in the defendant's decision of whether to testify.
In our adversary system, the judge generally does not intrude on
trial decisions made by the defendant and his attorney. In holding, for
example, that a trial judge had no duty to inquire whether a defendant
was deliberately choosing to wear jail clothes during his trial, the
United' States Supreme Court stated that "the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during
trial rests with the accused and his attorney."1' 1 Courts are wary of
what Sir Francis Bacon dubbed the "overspeaking judge."'182
Courts profess a special reason to be concerned about the role of
the trial judge vis-a-vis a defendant's decision on whether to testify.
This was expressed by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in 1987. In
the course of rejecting a Curtis system of on-the-record warnings and
waiver, the Court stated:
176. 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).
177. Id. at 411 n.2.
178. Commonwealth v. Waters, 399 Mass. 708, 506 N.E.2d 859, 865 n.3 (1987).
179. Coonce v. State, 171 Ga. App. 20, 318 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1984).
180. 318 S.E.2d at 765.
181. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
182. Commonwealth v.Campbell, 371 Mass. 40, 353 N.E.2d 740, 744 (1976).
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Unlike the right to a jury trial and the right to plead not guilty, the right to
testify has a mirror image which is constitutionally protected, viz., the right not
to testify, to remain silent. When a trial judge intercedes with a colloquy regarding jury trial or the right to plead not guilty, the judge's intentions are clear. He
is informing the defendant of constitutionally provided protections. The right to
testify is more complex. There is a risk that in explicating the right to testify the
judge will cast in unflattering light the right not to testify.18

Indeed, courts have criticized judges for remarks made to defendants
which appear to suggest how a defendant should decide the issue.,""
This fear of judicial interference with the right of the defendant to
choose whether or not to testify is often cited as a reason not to require
any on-the-record waiver.18 5 Even the Colorado Supreme Court-the
court that produced the Curtis decision-understands the potential
problems created by involving the trial judge in the defendant's decision. Several years after deciding Curtis, the court noted that even a
colloquy which appears proper in the appellate record might create
difficulties:
A trial judge, however, must be especially sensitive not to suggest by words,
tone of voice or demeanor that waiver is or is not a wise course of action when
183. Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 384, 502 N.E.2d 943, 947, review
denied, 399 Mass. 1102, 504 N.E.2d 1066 (1987).
184. See United States v. Goodwin, 770 F.2d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing as "disturbing" a colloquy between judge and defendant, after which defendant testified against advice of
attorney), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1084 (1986); United States v. Watkins, 519 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (judge's remarks placed unacceptable burden on appellant's fifth amendment privilege
to remain silent); United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1009 (10th Cir.) (noting possibility of judicial coercion in this area), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 934, vacated sub nom. Schreiner v.
United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971).
185. See United States v. Edwards, 897 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1989) (the trial judge's advising the defendant of his right to testify
could influence the defendant to waive his right not to testify); Siciliano v. Vose, 834 F.2d 29, 30
(Ist Cir. 1987) ("To require the trial court to follow a special procedure, . . . could inappropriately influence the defendant to waive his constitutional right not to testify, thus threatening the
exercise of [the right to testify]."); United States v. Wagner, 834 F.2d 1474, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987)
(judge's involvement directly with defendant might raise fifth and sixth amendment concerns);
United States v. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 752 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) ("danger of improper comment"); United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[It] would introduce possible
error ...

to require that the court ...

ask the defendant whether he wishes to testify."), va-

cated, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), on remand, 547 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1976) (reinstating portions of
original opinion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977); Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 415
(Iowa 1985) (trial court should not be involved in defendant's decision to testify); Commonwealth
v. Waters, 399 Mass. 708, 506 N.E.2d 859, 865 (1987) (where judge urges defendant to exercise
right to testify, judge might appear to be urging defendant to waive right not to testify).
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'the judge advises the defendant concerning either the waiver of the right to testify or the waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. 186

One would assume from these opinions that a system of on-the-record
waiver must, a fortiori, require substantial judicial involvement. One
court, in refusing to adopt a Curtis system of on-the-record waiver, explicitly stated that "[s]uch a requirement would necessarily entail the
trial court's advising defendant of his right to testify."'18 7 Yet even the
Curtis opinion does not so hold. Significantly, what Curtis does say
about alternative ways of obtaining an on-the-record waiver may hold
the key to solving the dilemma faced by those courts which understand
the utility of an on-the-record waiver of the right to testify, but are
wary of involving the trial judge in such a sensitive constitutional area.

VIII. A

POSSIBLE SOLUTION: ON-THE-RECORD WAIVER WITHOUT
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT

In Curtis, the Colorado Supreme Court described in some detail
how a waiver should be obtained from a defendant who does not choose
to testify.'8 8 Courts in other jurisdictions have heatedly debated the
propriety of having a trial judge obtain a waiver in the manner suggested by Curtis.8 9
Yet it does not appear that any court has noticed footnote 13 of
the Curtis opinion and the accompanying text.' 90 There, the court directly confronted the concern, voiced by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
in State v. Albright,'9' that injecting the trial judge into the defendant's decision to testify was fraught with difficulty. Curtis rejected Albright's concerns, holding that the trial court -"generally" will advise
the defendant properly.' 92 Yet Curtis went on to say: "The trial judge
could discharge this duty by permitting defense counsel to question the
defendant on-the-record in the presence of the judge. There may be
situations where it would be preferable to determine the defendant's
wishes in that manner."' 9 3 Curtis makes no attempt to describe what
these "situations" might be. It does not appear that any court has no186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 124 n.5 (Colo. 1986).
People v. Simmons, 140 Mich. App. 681, 364 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1985).
People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 514-15 (Colo. 1984).
See supra notes 160 & 184-85.
Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515 n.13.
96 Wis. 2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980).
See Curtis, 681 P.2d at 515 n.13.
Id. at 515.
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ticed this important suggestion in Curtis that it might be possible to
obtain an on-the-record waiver of the right to testify while avoiding
judicial involvement in the procedure. Yet such a procedure would
seem ideal for those courts which desire an on-the-record waiver but
wish to exclude the trial judge.
Obtaining a waiver through a procedure which circumvents the
trial judge would not seem to raise any constitutional problem per se,
even if the right is considered personal to the defendant. For example,
a guilty plea is valid only if the defendant tenders it voluntarily, intelligently, and understandingly.19 Yet the Supreme Court has refused to
require on constitutional grounds any specific warnings from the trial
judge; rather, the focus is on whether the plea itself is voluntary and
intelligent.'95 Likewise, it is not constitutionally required that the trial
judge and the defendant engage in a colloquy in order for a jury waiver
to be found valid. 196 There is no reason, then, why a colloquy between
judge and defendant concerning the defendant's right to testify should
be required as a constitutional matter even if the right to testify is considered a fundamental personal right.
Moreover, placing the onus of establishing the waiver on the defense solves another problem that arises when courts confront this issue: "When then ought the colloquy between judge and defendant occur? The judge cannot know that the defendant has not testified until
the defense has rested. That is surely an awkward time to engage in a
discussion with the defendant which might lead to a rupture with defense counsel . . . . 17 In a system in which the defense takes the ini194. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969).
195. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.4 (1984) (citing Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)).
196. See United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Martin,
704 F.2d 267 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Scott, 583 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978).
197. Commonwealth v. Hennessey, 23 Mass. App. Ct, 384, 502 N.E.2d 943, 947, review
denied, 399 Mass. 1102, 504 N.E.2d 1066 (1987). Accord United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d
750, 760 (9th Cir. 1989).
A lawyer's duty should be no different in those situations in which she believes the defendant
may wish to lie on the witness stand. In such a situation, the lawyer must carefully distinguish
between "right to testify" issues and sixth amendment issues.
Certainly the Supreme Court has made it clear that the right to testify does not include the
right to testify falsely. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 173 (1986) (citing Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971) and United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980)). Yet there is no authority suggesting that the fear of a defendant's possible perjury should ever permit an attorney to
refuse to inform the defendant that he indeed has the right to testify. Rather, from the attorney's
perspective, the perjurious defendant raises sixth amendment concerns.
The Supreme Court has suggested that "the attorney's first duty when confronted with a
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tiative, this problem is avoided. It is up to the defendant and his attorney to decide when they wish to place the waiver of the right to testify
into the record.
The courts which have rejected the Curtis system of on-the-record
waiver have simply assumed that the trial judge must take the leading
part in such a procedure. It is time, then, to consider seriously Curtis's
suggestion of an alternative which bypasses the trial judge.
IX.

INSURING A PROPER WAIVER OF THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
TESTIFY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO CURTIS

The alternative system would be comprised of the following:
1. At every criminal trial, the defendant must either a) testify on
his own behalf or b) waive his right to testify on the record.
2. Consistent with A.B.A. Standards,19 8 it is the responsibility of
the defense attorney to tell the defendant a) that the defendant has the
right to testify and b) that, although the defense attorney will offer
advice on this matter, the ultimate decision of whether to testify rests
with the defendant.
3. If, after weighing the advice of counsel, the defendant decides
not to testify, it is the responsibility of the defense attorney to request a
hearing outside the presence of the jury at some point during the defense case.
4. At this hearing, through questions posed by the defense attorney, the defendant should affirm that a) he understands he has the
right to testify; b) that he understands that no one can prevent him
from exercising this right; c) that if he testifies the prosecutor will have
the opportunity to cross-examine him; and, if applicable, d) that there
is a possibility that his testimony might be impeached with prior criminal convictions. His waiver should then be made orally as part of the
trial record.
5. A written waiver should also be made part of the trial record.
proposal for perjurious testimony is to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of
conduct." Nix, 475 U.S. at 169 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
(1983)). The decision to commit perjury implicates sixth amendment concerns, since "the right to
counsel includes no right to have a lawyer who will cooperate with planned perjury." Id. at 173. In
such a situation, the lawyer is allowed to withdraw from the case. Id.
Thus, a defendant has no right to lie on the stand; moreover, such behavior may result in his
losing the assistance of his counsel. Yet these issues are totally separate from the idea that the
defendant must know he has the right to testify and must ultimately decide whether to exercise

that right.
198. See

CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note

102.

HeinOnline -- 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 838 1989-1990

1990]

THE NEED FOR AN ON-THE-RECORD WAIVER

6. As a general rule, the prosecution and the trial judge should
play no role in the proceedings. However, the trial judge may pose
questions to the defendant and/or the defense counsel if the judge, in
her discretion, believes that there is evidence that the defendant is not
making a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to testify.
CONCLUSION

Rock v. Arkansas promises to spawn even more appeals from nontestifying defendants alleging infringement of the right to testify. It is
one thing for a jurisdiction to reject a Curtis approach with its heavy
reliance on the trial judge; it is quite another for a jurisdiction to utilize
no system at all. Relying on a defendant's "contemporaneous request"
is simply not consonant with the gravity of this right, which may very
well be construed as both personal and fundamental. The approach
suggested in this Article attempts to guarantee a knowing and intelligent waiver from the defendant, to create an appellate record which
discourages post-conviction challenges from the non-testifying defendant, and to meet the objections of those jurisdictions which fear that
the trial judge's participation in the decision might be coercive. It is
imperative that American jurisdictions understand the significance of
Rock and institute a mechanism for protecting a defendant's constitutional right to testify.
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